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A SEARCH FOR THE TRUTH OR TRIAL BY ORDEAL: WHEN
PROSECUTORS CROSS-EXAMINE ADOLESCENTS HOW
SHOULD COURTS RESPOND?
FRANK E. VANDERVORT*
It is an axiom of the law that cross-examination is, in John Henry
Wigmore's words, the "greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of
truth."' In part because of its perceived utility in getting to the truth of a
matter, courts are generally reluctant, despite broad authority to do so, to step
in and to govern the conduct of cross-examination. 2 But is cross-examination
invariably calculated to ascertain the truth? While most lawyers are familiar
with Wigmore's famous quotation, few are familiar with the caveat that shortly
follows it: "A lawyer can do anything with cross-examination.. . . He may, it
is true, do more than he ought to do; he . .. may make the truth appear like
falsehood." 3 Because of cross-examination's power to distort the truth,
4
Wigmore recognized the need for it to be controlled.
In seems clear that at least in some instances, cross-examination, as it is
conducted in contemporary American courtrooms, may in fact hinder the

* Clinical Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. I thank
Bridge McCormack for her helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article and Jon Fazzola
for his excellent research assistance.
1. 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, § 1367, at 32
(James H. Chabourn ed., Little Brown 1974). See generally Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316
(1974) ("Cross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and
the truth of his testimony are tested."); Jules Epstein, Cross-Examination: Seemingy Ubiquitous,
Purportedly Omniotent, and 'At Risk," 14 WIDENER L. REV. 427, 430-34 (2009) (discussing the
historical roots of the right to cross-examination and asserting that "as to all witnesses who
actually testify, and to at least a core aspect of hearsay, cross-examination is the sine qua non of
the adversary adjudicative process.").
2. 2

JOHN

E.B. MYERS, MYERS ON EVIDENCE IN CHILD, DOMESTIC AND ELDER

ABUSE CASES 651, 652 (2005). The other major rationale for courts' reluctance to too closely
govern cross-examination is that it is the means by which a criminal defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to confront witnesses against him is vindicated. See Dais, 415 U.S. at 315
("Confrontation means more than being allowed to confront the witness physically. 'Our cases
construing the [confrontation] clause hold that a primary interest secured by it is the right of
cross-examination.") (alteration in original) (citing Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S 415, 418
(1965)). Because this Article addresses the use of cross-examination by prosecutors and not
defense attorneys, the Confrontation Clause rationale is not at issue here. Some commentators
have criticized trial judges for being too willing to interfere with defendants' presentation of
evidence. See Louise Ellison, The Mosaic Art?: Cross-examination and the Vulnerable Witness, 21 J.
LEGAL STUD. 353, 366 (2001); Michael Pinard, Limitations on JudidalAcvism in CriminalTrials, 33
CONN. L. REv. 243 (2000).
3. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1367, at 32. Professor Epstein has recently observed that
the "mythic status of cross-exanination" may actually interfere with the trith finding process
because "leading questions are not always an appropriate or sufficient tool for truth finding."
Epstein, supranote 1, at 437.
4. WIGMORE, sapranote 1, § 1367, at 32.
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ascertainment of the truth. 5 Courts and commentators have generally
addressed the issue of cross-examination by considering and critiquing its
conduct by defense attorneys. 6 However, this Article considers how a
prosecutor conducts cross-examination on an adolescent defendant or an
adolescent witness testifying for the defense. I will argue that courts have a
duty to control prosecutors' conduct of cross-examination or run the risk of
frustrating the legal process's truth-seeking function. In order to define these
concerns, Part I of this Article will include an example from my practice as
well as other sources to illustrate the overly aggressive prosecutorial crossexamination techniques. Part II will briefly address the nature and purposes of
cross-examination, and will include a discussion of the prosecutor's right to
conduct a cross-examination. Part III will consider two areas of inquiry that
have received considerably more attention than the cross-examination of
juvenile defendants-the interviewing of possible child victims by social
workers and law enforcement officers and their questioning in court, as well as
the interrogation of juvenile suspects by law enforcement officers-and will
draw an analogy from those bodies of work to the issue presently considered.
Part IV will consider what tools are currently available to courts to control the
overly aggressive cross-examination of juvenile defendants and adolescent
witnesses called on behalf of the defense, and will argue that courts should
exercise their considerable authority to disallow such questioning.
I.
In this section, I first describe a case from earlier in my career in which a
prosecutor was permitted to overzealously cross-examine an adolescent
defendant, the harm that resulted from the prosecutor's actions, and the
court's unwillingness to exercise its duty to control the prosecutor's actions. I
then turn to case law and the literature for other examples of prosecutorial
overreaching when conducting cross on adolescents.
A.
I began my law career as a deputy defender in the Juvenile Defender Office
(JDO), a division of the Legal Aid and Defender Association of Detroit. The
JDO provided representation exclusively to children, with its caseload divided
5. See generally LUCY S. MCGOUGH, CHILD WITNESSES: FRAGILE VOICES IN THE
AMERICAN LEGAL SYsTEM 226-27 (1994) (discussing effect where cross-examination may cause
child witnesses to testify inaccurately); STEPHEN J. ADLER, THE JURY: TRIAL AND ERROR IN THE

AMERICAN COURTROOM 210 (1994) ("[qontrary to many lawyers' and jurors' instincts,
independent studies show that the stress of cross-examination, rather than forcing truth to the
surface, impairs memory and reduces the accuracy of testimony.").
6. See, e.g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986); Dais, 415 U.S. at 316;
MYERS, supra note 2, at 652; MCGOUGH supra note 5, at 170-71.
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between child protection and juvenile delinquency cases. This mix provided an
interesting contrast in how the law-and, more specifically, legal actors such as
prosecutors and judges-handled child witnesses. On the child protection side
of the docket, children were, of course, thought of as victims. When they
appeared in court, they were cared for and protected from the harshness that
so often characterizes the legal process. There were special waiting areas in the
courthouse if the child had to testify. Michigan, like other jurisdictions, has
numerous provisions in the law intended to protect child witnesses who
appear in child protection proceedings. 7 These include the use of leading
questions on direct examination,8 videorecorded statements9 and special
hearsay exceptions,1o closed circuit television to prevent children from having
to confront directly those who are alleged to have harmed the child," and
impartial questioners to pose questions to child witnesses.1 2 Lawyers were on
their best behavior, and judges would tolerate not the least bit of aggressive
questioning.
The allegedly delinquent minors received none of this solicitous attention.
They were perpetrators. Bad kids. Evil. In truth, they were very often the same
kids.1 But that is not how the legal system and the actors in the courtroom
treated them.
7. See genera/4 MYERS, supra note 2, at 157-90 (discussing various protections for child
witnesses); Ellison, supra note 2.
8. People v. Watson, 629 N.W.2d 411, 421-422 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (citing People
v. Kosters, 438 N.W.2d 651, 655 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989)); see also United States v. Demarrias, 876
F.2d 674, 678 (8th Cir. 1989) (approving prosecutions use of leading questions to conduct direct
examination of fourteen year old sexual assault victim); United States v. Nabors, 762 F.2d 642,
650-51 (8th Cir. 1985) (approving use of leading questions on direct exam with twelve year old
witness for the prosecution).
9. MICH. CoM-P. LAws SERV. § 712A.17b (LexisNexis 2005) (permitting videorecorded
statements of some child witnesses to be use in lieu of their in court testimony).
10. See MIcH. R. Evim. 803A (permitting child's hearsay statements describing sexual
abuse to be admitted in delinquency or criminal proceedings).
11. MICH. CT. R. 3.923(E).
12. MICH. CT. R. 3.923(F) ('The court may appoint an impartial person to address
questions to a child witness at a hearing as the court directs."). See generaly In re Brock, 499
N.W.2d 752, 755-56 (Mich. 1993) (using social worker as independent questioner during trial to
question child witness).
13. The relationship between children as victims of abuse and neglect and children
who become the perpetrators of delinquent and criminal acts is well documented. See JAMES
GARBARINO, LOST Boys: WHY OUR SONS TURN VIOLENT AND How WE CAN SAVE THEM 82

(1999); Cathy Spatz Widom et al., An Examinadion of Patbways from Childbood Vicimigadion to
Violence: The Role of Eary Aggression and Problemaic Alcohol Use, 21 VIOLENCE & VICTIMs 675
(2006) (finding that a history of child abuse or neglect victimization is directly and indirectly
predictive of arrest for violence); Katherine W. Scrivner, Student Essay, Crossover KIds: The
Dilemma of the Abused Deknquent, 40 FAM. CT. REv. 135, 136 (2002) (noting that "children
between the ages of nine and twelve who were reported abused or neglected were sixty-seven
times more likely to be arrested . . . .').This point has been recognized explicitly or implicitly by
courts at all levels. See, e.g., In re Nuitez, 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 242, 250 (Ct. App. 2009) (mitigating
minor's sentence after detail about a history of trauma including being physically abused by an
alcoholic father, seeing his brother murdered, being shot himself, and random violence in his

338

Widener Law Review

[Vol. 16: 335

While working at the JDO, I represented a fourteen year old boy whom I
will call DeShawn. Tall, broad shouldered and handsome with a ready and
enveloping smile, he was a first time offender charged with armed robbery.
The complaining witness, a somewhat portly thirty-two year old man, alleged
that DeShawn had confronted him at midday in front of his apartment
building on a busy street on the city's Westside, produced a gun, and
demanded his wallet. Scared, the man alleged that he handed over his wallet to
DeShawn, who then ran away down the street.
Within minutes, the police apprehended DeShawn based on the
complainant's description. Although this alleged crime took place in broad
daylight on a busy city street, there was not a single disinterested witness. The
police did not recover a wallet or a gun. In fact, no physical evidence of any
sort linked DeShawn to the crime. The man said he had nearly a hundred
dollars in cash in the wallet, but DeShawn had no cash when arrested.14
The case came down to a swearing contest. Would the judge believe the
complainant or DeShawn, who asserted that while there had been a
confrontation with the complainant, he did not have a gun and did not take
the man's wallet? DeShawn explained that the confrontation had been over
money. He explained that he had been, for some time, permitting this man to
perform sexual acts on him in exchange for money. The man had not paid.
DeShawn testified that he confronted the man about the money he was owed,
and when the man did not pay, DeShawn said he would call the police. In the
foot race to the telephone, DeShawn lost.
At trial, the complainant was the prosecution's first witness. After
identifying DeShawn, he testified that he never saw my client before that day
on the street in front of his apartment. I was fairly certain that this was a lie
because I had three witnesses-all, like DeShawn, teenage boys who claimed
that the complainant had paid them to have sexual relations-waiting in the
hallway prepared to testify that they had seen the complainant and DeShawn
together on numerous occasions. On cross-examination, I reiterated the
complainant's testimony that he had never seen my client before the day of the
alleged robbery. The prosecutor seemed confused by my insistence on this
point. Then I directly asked the complainant if it was true that he had seen my
client before, and that he had in fact paid him to perform sexual acts. The

neighborhood); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 393 (2005) (holding that an adult death penalty
defendant's rights were violated when his history of victimization as a child was not presented as
mitigating evidence during sentencing phase of proceeding).
14. Technically, DeShawn was not "arrested." Under Michigan law an alleged juvenile
delinquent is "take[n] into custody" or detained. See MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 712A.14(1)
(LexisNexis 2005). In fact the police ordered him at gun point to lie face down on the sidewalk
after which he was handcuffed, searched, and transported to the major crimes unit of the
Detroit Police Department in the backseat of a police cruiser. By any reasonable definition,
DeShawn was arrested.
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prosecutor exploded. When the dust settled, the judge allowed the question.
Predictably, the complainant denied the allegation.
Then, the police officer that responded to the armed robbery call took the
stand to testify. He gave us an unexpected. gift. In answering a question asked
by the prosecutor, he mentioned in passing that he had previously seen
DeShawn and the complainant together in a parked car a few days before the
alleged armed robbery. They were in the back seat and the officer testified that
he simply told them to move along. The officer's testimony made it clear that
the complainant had lied.
The judge, correctly, denied our motion for a directed verdict. I called
DeShawn. He denied ever taking the man's wallet and then testified at length
about his relationship with the complainant and his threat to report him to the
police if he did not pay the money he owed. The prosecutor was livid. His
cross-examination was brutal. He humiliated the kid, called him a liar, yelled
and screamed, and literally pounded on the table. At times he physically
intimidated DeShawn by standing only inches from him and screaming his
questions. The court overruled repeated objections to the prosecutor's
conduct and tone. "This is cross-examination," the judge said repeatedly.
Finally, after this abuse went on for nearly half an hour, and after it was clear
that his frustration and anger were building, DeShawn lost his temper. In
response to a question asking DeShawn to describe exactly what the man had
done to him, DeShawn responded, "He sucked my d***, Motherf*****."15
B.
16
My experience in representing DeShawn does not appear to be unique. A
review of the case law and the literature provides other examples of

15. The judge found DeShawn guilty of armed robbery. She found that in the
swearing contest between DeShawn and the complainant, the adult man who had obviously and
demonstrably lied to her, was the more credible witness. This experience was not unusual during
my years in the JDO. Prosecutors routinely questioned juvenile defendants and their adolescent
witnesses in a hostile and aggressive manner, and courts repeatedly refused to exercise their
authority to control such behavior. In many instances the testifying youth, after growing
frustrated and angry, lashed out only to have the court find such behavior indicative of their lack
of credibility.
16. While this article addresses the overly zealous cross-examination of adolescent
witnesses, prosecutor's use of intimidating and hostile tactics is certainly not limited to their
treatment of youthful witnesses. For videotaped example of a prosecutor using these tactics
with an adult defendant, see Interesting Cross-examination by a Prosecutor, http://albany(last visited Feb. 19,
lawyer.blogspot.com/2009/01/interesting-cross-examination-by.html
2010). In this video clip, a prosecutor is cross-examining an adult defendant in a murder
prosecution. The first two questions arte delivered from behind a podium and in a firm but
moderate tone of voice. By the third question, the prosecutor begins to escalate his tone, his
voice becoming louder. By the fifth question, his voice is raised well beyond a moderate tone. In
short, he is yelling at the witness. This draws an objection from defense counsel that "he's
screaming at the witness," which the court promptly overrules. At this point, the prosecutor
leaves the podium, moves closer to the witness, and begins to scream his questions in an
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prosecutorial overreaching when conducting cross-examination on adolescent
witnesses, and the predictable response of these immature witnesses to the
prosecutor's behavior.' 7
In the Washington, D.C. case In rv LG.,'8 a sixteen year old was called to
testify as a witness for the defendant in a murder prosecution.' 9 During crossexamination, the prosecutor attempted to demonstrate that L.G. had lied
during direct. 20 In the course of this testimony, the prosecutor asked the
following: "You just told [defense counsel] a few minutes ago, you always have
you[r] gun with you. Right? You said-" 2'1 L.G. interjected at this point: "I said
it was in the car, motherf****. Don't be coming hollering at me like that,
man." 22 In the teen's response, we glean something of the prosecutor's tone
and conduct that is not discernable from the dry trial transcript; it is clear that
the teen felt as though the prosecutor was yelling at him.
Further on in the cross, the prosecutor asked this long and complicated
question:
So, if your uncle said that [the deceased] was minding his own business and
walked out of this building, didn't say a thing to anybody, didn't pull a weapon
on anybody, and just walked out of here and then you jumped off the steps and
started shooting at him while your uncle is sitting right there, that's not true. Is
that what you are saying?2 3
L.G., obviously confused by this question, responded, "Hold on, man. You
got to slow the f*** down. I don't know what the f*** you are saying." 24
argumentative fashion. Again the defense attorney objects, the frustration in his voice is plain.
"I've overruled it," comes the judge's response. This seems to give the prosecutor permission to
escalate his actions; he becomes more argumentative, continues screaming his questions and
pronounces, "My God! Is this your testimony?" Another objection by defense counsel as to
both the way in which the question is asked and the characterization in the witness' testimony.
The judge strikes from the record the characterization as the video clip fades. Id. The
prosecutor's behavior led to a motion for a mistrial by the defense, which was denied. See Jim
O'Hara,Defendant Calm As ProseautorShouts-Stacey CastorDiplays No Emotion In Responding to DA's
Cross-Examination, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), Jan. 31, 2009, at Bl (noting that the
prosecutor "alternated between sarcasm and shouting").
17. While this example involves an adolescent called as a defense witness on behalf of
an adult defendant, I use it because it illustrates, again, what appears to be a relatively routine
practice of prosecutors overzealously interrogating adolescent witnesses and their responses. Of
course, similar responses no doubt result from prosecutors' cross-examination of adults, but
because of developmental differences which will be discussed later in this article, I do not
address these responses by adults.
18. In re LG., 639 A.2d 603 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
19. Id. at 604.
20. Id.
21. Id. (alteration in original).
22. Id.
23. Id. (alteration in original).
24. In re L G., 639 A.2d at 604.
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Later, as he was walking away from the witness stand, past the prosecutor, he
apparently called her a "stinking b****." 25
These examples illustrate that: 1) prosecutors do not hesitate to question
young people very aggressively, and courts permit such questioning; 2) a
prosecutors' tone of voice can be loud and intentionally intimidating; 3) courts
permit prosecutors to ask convoluted, multipart questions of youthful defense
witnesses; and 4) young witnesses may sometimes act impulsively and
impetuously when dealing with the frustration caused by cross-examination. 26
In my experience, some youths in this position simply shut down as a result of
the stress of trying to cope with cross-examination rather than lash out. 27 They
become silent and refuse to answer more questions. 28
While I have been unable to find any empirical data analyzing this point, it
appears that other practitioners have had similar experiences. For example,
Professor Thomas Geraghty of Northwestern University Law School has
written briefly about excessively zealous prosecutorial cross-examination
during his long experience in representing youths in delinquency and criminal
proceedings. He writes:
Anyone who has defended a child in criminal court knows that putting a child
on the stand in that setting is often unwise. Children who are defendants in
adult criminal proceedings rarely make good witnesses. And their testimony is
often made even less credible by the aggressiveness of cross-examinations that
are likely to occur in the criminal court setting. A child cross-examined by a
skilled adversary is unlikely to survive the battle of credibility.
Admittedly, cross-examinations of children in juvenile court can be just as
aggressive, mean spirited, and abusive as cross-examinations of children in
criminal court .... 29
What one English commentator observed of child witnesses in the United
Kingdom seems similarly true of adolescents called to testify on their own
behalf or on behalf of other defendants in the United States: "children in
25. Id.
26. In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-70 (2005), Justice Kennedy discusses at
some length the developmentally normative propensity of adolescents to act with
impetuousness and impulsivity.
27. These reactions by young witnesses do not take place only when prosecutors
conduct cross-examination. Adolescent witnesses sometimes lash out in this manner when
cross-examined by defense attorneys, too. See, e.g., Joseph P. Fried, Witness in Howard Beach Case
Erupts During Relentless Cross-Examinadon, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1987, at B1 (reporting on
testimony of nineteen year old witness who lashed out at a defense attorney during crossexamination with profanity and refused to testify).
28. See, e.g., People v. Davidson, No. D044834, 2005 WL 3346290, at *34 (Cal. Ct.
App. Dec. 9, 2005) (complaining adolescent witness in a sexual assault case refused to answer
questions on cross-examination and her testimony stricken from the record).
29. Thomas F. Geraghty, Jusicefor Children: How Do We Get There?, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 190, 224 (1997) (internal citations omitted).
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criminal trials 'are afforded little sensitivity, dignity or respect, even less the
chance to present their account of events in a straightforward or meaningful
way."' 30
Of course, much has been written about child witnesses, 3' and most
32
jurisdictions now have laws that protect child witnesses in some contexts.
But little seems to have been said in legal or social science literatures or in case
33
law about this issue when the witness is an adolescent defendant.
II.
Cross-examination is rooted in the theory that a witness will not disclose all
that is relevant upon questioning by his or her proponent, leaving open the
possibility that the trier of fact will be deprived of information that is
necessary for an accurate understanding of the matter.34 Wigmore details two
broad concerns that are the proper subjects of cross-examination, each wellknown. The first concern is that the witness will not divulge all that he or she
35
knows about the facts and circumstances of the matter in issue. Thus, the
opposing party must be allowed to conduct cross-examination to bring to light
the facts known to the witness but left undisclosed during direct examination.
Secondly, there may be matters bearing the witness's credibility that should be
considered in order to aid the trier of fact in assessing the value of the

30. Ellison, supra note 2, at 356 (citing Helen L. Westcott, Children'sExperiences of Being
Examined and Cross-examined: The Opportunipto be Heard?,4 EXPERT EVIDENCE 13, 14 (1995)).
31. See, e.g., John E.B. Myers, Children in Court, in CHILD WELFARE LAW AND
PRACTICE: REPRESENTING CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND STATE AGENCIES IN ABUSE, NEGLECT,
AND DEPENDENCY CASES 323 (Marvin Ventrell & Donald N. Duquette eds., 2005); McGOUGH,

supra note 5.
32. See generally MYERS, supra note 2, at 167-176 (providing numerous examples of
statutes intended to protect young witnesses from trauma associated with testifying in court and
to facilitate the taking of children's testimony).
33. There are a number of cases that address the testimonial capacity and conduct
when an adolescent is a victim-typically of sexual abuse. See, e.g., Unites States v. Littlewind,
551 F.2d 244, 245 (8th Cir. 1977) (approving prosecutor's use of leading questions on direct
where adolescent victims of sexual assault were questioned); United States v. Flute, 363 F.3d
676, 678-69 (8th Cir. 2004). Social science and legal literature seem entirely devoid of
consideration of children's testimony in this context. See, e.g., Ellison, supra note 2; Jessica OwenKostelnik et al., Testimony and Interrogation of Minors: Assumptons About Maturiy and Moraki, 61
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 286 (2006).

34. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1368, at 37.
35. Id. Wigmore provides two rationales for this belief. First, he argues that most
witnesses are partisans. Id Secondly, witnesses respond to questions asked by counsel, and each
lawyer is likely only to ask about the facts known to the witness that favor his.or her case. Id.;
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) ("[Ihe cross-examiner is not only permitted to delve
into the witness' story to test the witness' perceptions and memory, but the cross-examiner has
traditionally been allowed to impeach, i.e., discredit, the witness.").
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witness's testimony.36 Cross-examination has a powerful influence on the trier
of fact because it is immediate, as it follows close on the heels of direct, and
because it draws additional facts and credibility-damaging information from
the witness's own mouth rather than requiring collateral forms of proof.37
The right of an accused to conduct cross-examination upon adverse
witnesses has ancient roots. 38 Over time, it has become an essential element of
the common-law system of justice.39 Weary of the power of the state to
condemn an accused on untested testimony, the right of cross-examination
was ensured to a defendant through the adoption of the Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause. 0 Writing recently in Crawford, the United States
Supreme Court observed that "the Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure reliability
of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It
commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a
particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination." 41 Indeed,
"'[t]he main and essential purpose of confrontation is to securefor the opponent the
opportunity of cross-examination.' 42 Thus, in both federal and state prosecutions,
the defendant must be given the opportunity to confront witnesses against
him and to put questions to those witnesses which test the accuracy and
truthfulness of statements, test the witness's bias, prejudice, along with other
interest in the outcome of the matter. 43
In contrast to a criminal defendant, the prosecutor enjoys no specifically
articulated constitutional right to cross-examine witnesses called by the
defense. Rather, the prosecutor's right to cross-examine witnesses called on
behalf of the defense is more general. It is rooted in the common law notion
that a litigant must be allowed to test an adverse witness's testimony through
cross-examination to ensure that his or her statements enhance the trial's truth
36. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1368, at 37. While in theory the proponent of a witness
has no interest in disclosing to the trier of fact information that might suggest his witness is
untrustworthy, in practice, law students and lawyers are generally encouraged to do just this to
prevent the opponent from disclosing these facts first. See THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIAL
TECHNIQUES 114 (7th ed. 2007).

37. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1368, at 38.
38. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004) (citing Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S.
1012, 1015 (1988)) (noting that "[t]he right to confront one's accusers is a concept that dates
back to Roman times").
39. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43-47 (discussing English common law's development of
the right to confrontation and cross-examination and distinguishing it from the civil law use of
exparte examination).
40. Id. at 49. The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
U.S.
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him .
CONST. amend. VI.
41. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
42. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974) (quoting 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE,
A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw

§

1395 (3d ed. 1940)).
43. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 36; Melendez-Diaz
v. Massachusetts, 129 S.Ct. 2527 (2009).

344

Widener Law Review

[Vol. 16: 335

seeking function.44 As such, this right may be granted, altered or even denied
by legislative enactment, 45 court rule46 or the applicable rules of evidence. 47
Even though the prosecutor enjoys the right to cross-examine defense
witnesses, the court is not without authority to limit its scope or control the
method by which it is conducted.48 As discussed below, the court has a duty to
do so in certain circumstances.4 9
III.
The United States Supreme Court has recently recognized that adolescents,
as a result of normal developmental processes, are distinguishable from adults
in ways that are important to the criminal justice system.50 Writing for the
majority in Roper v. Simmons, Justice Kennedy outlined three broad areas of
development that distinguishes adolescent defendants from their adult
counterparts.5 1 Of these, one, the developmental immaturity of youth, which
often leads to impulsive and impetuous behavior, is most relevant to the

44. See generaly WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1367, at 32-36.
45. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-117 (2001).
A defendant in a criminal action or proceeding shall not be compelled to be a witness
against himself, but may be a witness in his own behalf. If he offers himself as a witness
in his own behalf, he may be cross-examined to the same extent and subject to the same
rules as any other witness.
Id.; MICH. CoMP. LAws SERV. § 600.2158 (LexisNexis 2005); MINN. STAT.
Cium. PRoc. LAw § 190.50 (McKinney 2010).
46. See, e.g., MICH. CT. R. 6.414(B).

§ 595.07

(2008); N.Y.

The trial court must control the proceedings during trial, limit the evidence and
arguments to relevant and proper matters, and take appropriate steps to ensure that the
jurors will not be exposed to information or influences that might affect their ability to
render an impartial verdict on the evidence ....
Id.
47. See FED. R. EVID. 611.
48. See generall Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 673, 679 (1986) (observing that a
trial court may limit cross-examination of witnesses "based on concerns about, among other
things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is
repetitive or only marginally relevant").
49. See infra section IV.
50. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-71 (2005) (abolishing the imposition of
the death penalty on defendants who were below eighteen years of age at the time of the crime).
The Court recently extended the principals set forth in Roper to the imposition of life without
parole on juvenile defendants. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
51. The three distinguishing features of are 1) immaturity; 2) susceptibility to peer
pressure; and 3) lack of full character development. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70.
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current discussion. 52 Because this developmental immaturity is the result of
normal development of the adolescent brain, even older adolescents, sixteen
to eighteen year olds, who are cognitively similar to adults, may lack the social
maturity to exercise sound judgment.53 The younger the adolescent, the less
developed that youth's brain is likely to be, and therefore, the poorer his or her
judgment is likely to be. 54 These youths' psychosocial immaturity leads to poor
decision-making, a problem that is exacerbated when the youth is acting under
stress.55 Yet, training manuals that teach cross-examination contain a good
52. I have seen this impulsivity and impetuousness play out in different ways in the
courtroom. As the examples that began this article demonstrate, youthful witnesses sometimes
lash out at a prosecutor's overzealous cross-examination, while at other times youth shut down.
They may simply refuse to answer further questions, which risks their entire testimony being
stricken from the record.
53. See ELIZABETH S. Scort & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE
JUSTICE 36-44 (2008).
54. Id. at 44-50.
55. C. Antoinette Clarke, The Baby and the Bathwater- Adolescent Offending and Punitive
juvenile Jusice Reform, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 659, 709 (2005).
Testing in adolescents shows mild decreases in frontal lobe function, which, when
coupled with the increased levels of sex hormones that accompany puberty, can lead to
hyperresponsiveness to stimuli. Normal adolescents appear to have brains equivalent to
those suffering from a mild anxiety disorder. The more time spent in this hypofrontal
state, the more indiscriminate the responses to otherwise innocuous stimuli ... . Puberty
becomes the last straw, so to speak, placing the young person in a position in which a
simple event may elicit an overblown, impulsive, or violent reaction. Violence and rage
are released indiscriminately, and fight-or-flight responses with a "kill-or-be-killed"
attitude are expressed without a moment's reflection. The adolescent reacts to events
without interpreting them appropriately, and then acts inappropriately, that is, "without
controls."
Id.
This suggests that adults are wired to be reflective when interpreting emotional stimuli
while adolescents are wired to be reactive. A child is more likely to react than to try to
think through his or her options in an emotionally charged situation. In the same study,
Yurgelun-Todd also found that adolescents frequently misidentified facial expressions
and identified expressions as exhibiting anger or fear where adults saw something else.
These findings suggest that kids are doubly handicapped in stressful situations involving
emotional stimuli. That is, they both misinterpret the stimuli they are trying to process
and they lack the ability to access their higher-order reasoning centers when considering
how to respond to the stimuli.
Kenneth J. King, Waiving Childhood Goodbye: How Juvenile Courts Fail to Protect Children
From Unknowing, Unintelligent, and Involuntary Waivers of Miranda Rights, 2006 Wis. L. REV.
431, 442-43 (internal citations omitted).
Yurgelun-Todd's work on how adolescents process the emotional stimuli of facial
expressions suggests that a child who is subjected to interrogation in tense, serious
circumstances may well misinterpret the stimuli and will not process them in the same
way an adult would. Thus, the child may see an angry and threatening face where the
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deal of advice that suggests that prosecutors should endeavor to increase a
witness's stress. 56
It must be noted that the Court in Roper focused on the normal
developmental processes of youth. This is true of most scholarly writing in the
field, as well.57 Most adolescent juvenile defendants, however, have had life
experiences that impede normal developmental trajectories, sometimes
severely.58 For instance, it is estimated that twenty to twenty-five percent of
59
juvenile offenders suffer from serious, biologically based mental illnesses.
Researchers estimate that the rate of mental illness among delinquent youth is
at least twice the rate in the general population. 60 Additionally, many youth
caught up in the juvenile and criminal justice systems suffer from learning
disabilities that may impede their capacity to understand the legal system and
to integrate information. 61Delinquent youth suffer from grossly elevated rates
adult would recognize the face as determined or stern, but not as angry or threatening.
That the adult interrogator did not intend to look angry or threatening or intend his or
her words to threaten is largely irrelevant to whether the child perceived a threat.
Id. at 471-72.
56. See, e.g., Kyle C. Reeves, Effective Cross-examination Techniques: A Prosecutor's View
(Kings County Criminal Bar Ass'n, Feb. 27, 2008), available at www.kcba.org/kyle/ 20reeves/
20cross%20exam%20outline.pdf (advising prosecutors not to "give the witness a chance to
think about their answers" and to "[slet subtle traps for [the] witness"); Brian K. Holmgren,
Effecve Cross-examination Strategies in Child Maltreatment Cases (unpublished training manuscript
outline on file with the author). See generally MAUET, supra note 36, at 251-311 (discussing
techniques for effective cross-examination).
57. See generally Dorothy Otnow Lewis et al., Ethics Quesions Raised ly the
Neuropychiatric, Neuropycholocal,Educational,Developmental, and Family Characteristicsof 18 Juveniles
Awaiting Execution in Texas, 32 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 408 (2004).
58. See id. (detailing numerous developmental challenges faced by violent adolescents).
59. David E. Arredondo et al., An Evaluation of the Naion's Firstjuvenile Mental Health
Courtfor Delinquent Youth with Chronic Mental Health Needs, 2009 CHILD. L. MANUAL SERIES 205
(citing David E. Arredondo et al., juvenile Mental Health Court: Rationale and Protocols, JUv. & FAM.
CT. J. Fall 2001, at 1); THOMAS GRisso, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: ADOLESCENT OFFENDERS WITH

MENTAL DISORDERS (2004); see also Soloman Moore, Mentally Ill Offenders Stretch the Limits of
juvenile justice, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 10, 2009, at Al (estimating that two-thirds of juveniles in state
custody suffer from at least one mental illness).
60. Arredondo et al., supra note 59, at 206 (citing Joseph J. Cocozza & Kathleen R.
Skowyra, Youth With Mental Health Disorders: Issues and Emerging Responses, Juv. JUST. (Office of
Juv. Just. & Delinq. Prevention, Wash. D.C.), Apr. 2000, at 3, 6). Thomas Grisso, one of the
nation's leading researchers in the mental health issues impacting juvenile justice, has observed
that the juvenile justice system has become the primary point of referral for mentally ill youth.
GRiSso, supra note 59, at 5; see also Moore, supra note 59 (noting that "[a]ccording to a
Government Accountability Office report, in 2001, families relinquished custody of 9,000
children to juvenile justice systems so they could receive mental health services.").
61. See Tamar R. Birckhead, The Age of the Child: Interrogatingjuveniles After Roper v.
Simmons, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 385, 417 (2008) (citing Marty Beyer, What's Behind Behavior
Matters: The Effects of Disabiliies,Trauma and Immaturiy on Juvenile Intent and Abiky to Assist Counsel,
58 GUILD PRAC. 112, 112 (2001) (noting that between seventeen and fifty-three percent of
juveniles charged with criminal offenses have learning disabilities)); William Arroyo, PTSD in
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of post-traumatic stress disorder. 62 Many youth in the juvenile system
experience the co-occurrence of more than one of these developmental
inhibitors. 63 Many of these developmental challenges may arise from the
child's history of victimization and exposure to traumatic life events, such as
fetal exposure to alcohol, child abuse and neglect, and exposure to violence
within their home and community of origin, all of which can alter a child's
development.64 Moreover, delinquent youth are much more likely to have
histories of substance abuse than youth in the general population. 65 Despite
the developmental issues-both normal and abnormal-there are no explicit
protections that exist in the law for juvenile defendants when they testify. As
will be discussed in more detail later in this article, some child witness
protections intended to protect younger children are written broadly enough
that they could arguably be invoked to protect an adolescent witness, at least is
some cases. 66 Too often, however, the law excludes these youth from the
67
protection of statutes aimed at protecting young witnesses. This is typically
accomplished by defining "child" in such a way that delinquent defendants,
68
and possibly all adolescent witnesses, are excluded.
Despite the commonality of issues when the witness is an older child and is
thought to be a perpetrator of crime rather than a victim, the crossexamination of juvenile defendants and adolescent witnesses by prosecutors
has received little, if any, direct attention in the literature. 69 However, two
analogous areas of concern have received considerable attention by courts and
academic researchers and provide insight in the current discussion. The first
relates generally to child witnesses, which has, for some two decades, been a

Children and Adolescents in the Juvenilejastice System, in PTSD IN CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTs 59,
61 (Spencer Eth ed., 2001).
62. Arroyo, supra note 61, at 63 (noting that studies of youth in the juvenile justice
24
% to 48.9%, which reflect rates four to eight times
system have found rates of PTSD from
higher in the juvenile justice population than the community at large); see also In re Nufiez, 93
Cal. Rptr. 3d 242 (Ct. App. 2009) (describing the traumatic history of one adolescent defendant
who had been shot, seen his brother murdered, lived in a neighborhood where shooting was a
commonplace occurrence and lived in a household where domestic violence was prevalent).
63. Arroyo, supra note 61, at 61-62.
64. See id. at 62-67.
65. Id. at 67 (noting studies that have found drinking alcohol to be a problem in
34.5% to 37% of incarcerated youth while it is an identified problem in only 10.2% to 18.4% of
the general youth population, and studies that have found as many as 83% of youth in secure
juvenile facilities have substance abuse problems).
66. See infra Part IV.B.
67. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (2006).
68. Id. (defining "child" as "a person who is under the age of 18, who is alleged to be
(A) a victim of a crime of physical abuse, sexual abuse, or exploitation; or (B) a witness to a
crime committed against another person").
69. Most commentators address the right of cross-examination from the perspective
of constitutional analysis and focus on the criminal defendant's right to cross-examine as a
function of the Sixth Amendment confrontation right. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 1, at 430-31;
MYERS, supra note 2, at 650-55.
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matter of intense study, producing a vast literature and numerous court
opinions. Secondly, and more recently, scholars have begun to study the
impact of police interrogation methods on adolescent suspects. This part of
the article will briefly examine relevant material from these two fields of study
and will argue that these areas of concern are relevant to the discussion of
cross-examination of juvenile defendants and adolescent witnesses by the
prosecution.
A.
Legal and social science literature are replete with discussion and debate
about the strengths and weaknesses of child witnesses. 70 Similarly, numerous
court opinions highlight the challenges that child testimony presents for the
legal system.7 ' Two major concerns have driven these discussions over the
past twenty years. First, the concern about the ability of children and
adolescents to relate their stories of victimization in the courtroom without
special procedures has led to the adoption of numerous child witness
protections. 72 Some of these protections are explicitly outlined in statute or
court rule. 3 Other concerns, such as allowing the prosecutor to use leading
questions on direct examination with a young witness, have come about
through traditional common law methodologies. This evolution occurred
because of the discretion and latitude that trial judges gave prosecutors in
presenting evidence, and the subsequent approval of this practice by the
appellate courts. 74
Secondly, concern about the suggestibility of children when being
questioned by investigators outside the courtroom has led courts and
legislatures to adopt special precautions to ensure the reliability of children's

70. See generally SHERRIE BOURG CARTER, CHILDREN IN THE COURTROOM:
CHALLENGES FOR LAWYERS AND JUDGES (2005); STEPHEN J. CECI & MAGGIE BRUCK,
JEOPARDY IN THE COURTROOM: A SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS OF CHILDREN'S TESTIMONY (1995);
BILLY WRIGHT DZIECH & CHARLES SCHUDSON, ON TRIAL: AMERIcA'S COURTS AND THEIR
TREATMENT OF SExUALLY ABUSED CHILDREN (2d ed. 1991); DEBRA A. POOLE & MICHAEL
LAMB, INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWS OF CHILDREN: A GUIDE FOR HELPING PROFESSIONALS

(1998); MCGoUGH, supra note 5; MYERS, supra note 2.
71. See generally MYERS, supra note 2 (discussing hundreds of cases addressing various
aspects of child witnesses).
72. See id. at 157-90 (discussing various child witness protections).
73. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (2006) (providing protections for witnesses under age
eighteen including the use of closed-circuit television and videotaped depositions).
74. See, e.g., United States v. Littlewind, 551 F.2d 244, 245 (8th Cir. 1977) (approving
use of leading questions when prosecutor questioned thirteen and fourteen year old witnesses);
United States v. Demarrias, 876 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1989) (approving use of leading questions by
prosecutor when questioning fourteen year old victim); United States v. Grassrope, 342 F.3d
866, 869 (8th Cir. 2003) (approving prosecutor's use of leading questions on direct examination
of seventeen year old victim).
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testimony. 75 Much of this scholarship and commentary has focused on
interviewing and presenting the testimony of younger children. 76 More
recently, researchers have begun to focus on the suggestibility of older
children and adolescents. 77 These researchers have found that little
78
differentiates older children from younger children in terms of suggestibility.
Indeed, some studies have found that older children are more susceptible to
suggestion then younger children.79
Adolescents are developmentally distinct from both younger children and
adults. 80 While intellectually they are perhaps closer to adults, psychosocially,
they may more closely approximate children.8' In general, legal professionals
are prone to overestimate the linguistic capacities of adolescents. 82 Although
adolescents may be adult-like in intellectual functioning, courts have long
recognized that trial practices may need to be altered to accommodate them
when they must testify. 83 For instance, in UnitedStates v. Rossbach,M the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a prosecutor's use of leading questions
during direct examination of fifteen and seventeen year old complaining
witnesses in a sexual assault prosecution where "the prosecution's use of
leading questions was necessary and was not excessive."85 Moreover, federal
75. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAws SERV. § 722.628(6) (LexisNexis 2005) (mandating that
child protective services mivestigators use a model interview protocol); State v. Michaels, 642
A.2d 1372 (N.J. 1994) (requiring "taint" hearings to ensure that children have not experienced
suggestive interviewing before their testimony may be admitted at trial); STATE OF MICH.,
GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON CHILDREN'S JUSTICE & DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
FORENSIC INTERVIEWING PROTOCOL (2005).

76. Owen-Kostelnik et al., supra note 33, at 291.
77. Id.; see also MYERS, supra note 2, at 25-28 (discussing briefly the suggestibility of
adolescents).
78. Owen-Kostelnik et al., supranote 33, at 291 (citing several studies).
79. Id. (citing two studies).
80. Scan & STEINBERG, sepra note 53, at 28-60.
81. Id. at 36-38.
82. POOLE & LAMB, supra note 70, at 154 (citing findings that younger children
sometimes perform better than older children when questioned in court "because adults asked
them simpler questions, indicating that the legal professionals had adjusted the complexity of
their speech for younger witnesses"); Ellison, supra note 2, at 356 n.12 (citing MARK BRENNAN
& ROSLIN E. BRENNAN, STRANGE LANGUAGE: CHILD VICTIMS UNDER CROSS-EXAMINATION
(1988)) (citing an example in which a fifteen year old makes the following statement when
interviewed by researchers: "Some of the words [the lawyers] use, the long words that they
might use and they might not even know the meaning of [sic]. And yet they sit there and they
don't tell you and they expect you to answer.").
83. See United States v. Littlewind, 551 F.2d 244, 244-45 (8th Cit. 1977) (approving
trial court's decision to permit the prosecutor to use leading questions on direct examination of
thirteen and fourteen year old complainants); United States v. Demarrias, 876 F.2d 674, 678 (8th
Cir. 1989) (approving use of leading questions during prosecutor's direct examination of
fourteen year old witness); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (2006) (permitting the use of various witness
protections for "child" witnesses and defining "child" as "a person who is under the age of 18"
who is the victim of a crime or is a witness to a crime committed upon another person).
84. United States v. Rossbach, 701 F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1983).
85. Id. at 718.
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law specifically provides that courts may utilize protective measures to ensure
that a witness who is under eighteen or who suffers from "mental or other
infirmity" has a fair opportunity for their voices to be heard in the judicial
process. 86
Suggestibility concerns have led scholars and courts to express concern
about interviewer bias. 87 An interviewer's bias may influence how the
interview is conducted, and this may then influence the accuracy of the
interviewee's testimony.88 Evidence of an interviewer's bias can be discerned
when the interviewer evinces a singular focus in gathering only the evidence
that will confirm his preconceived understanding of the facts.89 Alternative
explanations are discounted if not disregarded entirely. 90 Biased interviewers
tend to use more leading questions than unbiased interviewers "which serve to
confirm [the interviewer's] own beliefs rather than obtain an accurate account
of what actually happened." 9' For this reason, the highly regarded forensic
psychologist Sherrie Bourg Carter has flatly stated that leading questions "have
no place in child witness interviews ... ."92
B.
The methods used by law enforcement officers to interrogate adolescents
have long been a source of concern.93 In 1948, the Supreme Court addressed
the interrogation of juvenile suspects in HaIy v. Ohio. In Haley, a fifteen year
old alleged accomplice in a robbery-shooting was questioned by numerous
86. 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (2006).
87. CECI & BRUCK, supra note 70, at 79-94; POOLE & LAMB, supra note 70, at 67; see
also State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1376 (N.J. 1994).
88. CECI & BRUCK, supra note 70, at 92.
89. Id. at 79.
One of the hallmarks of interviewer bias is the single-minded attempt to gather only
confirmatory evidence and to avoid all avenues that may produce negative or inconsistent
evidence. Thus, while gathering evidence to support his hypothesis, an interviewer may
fail to gather any evidence that could potentially disconfirm his hypothesis.
Id.
90. Id. at 79-80.
91. BOURG CARTER, supra note 70, at 41.
92. Id. at 22.
93. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 46 (1967) (citing In re Gregory W. & Gerald S., 224 N.E.2d
102 (N.Y. 1966) (finding that a twelve year old suspect was questioned from 8:00 p.m. until 1:00
a.m. before confessing, and questioning continued for almost twenty-four hours)); Gallegos v.
Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); In re Carlo & Stasilowicz, 225
A.2d 1 10 (N.J. 1966) (discussing how a fifteen yest old fifth grader was questioned for over four
hours before making an oral confession, with a written confession taken two hours later); Barry
C. Feld, Poice Intergation of jutenies: An Empirical Study of Poley and Practice, 97 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 219 (2006).
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police officers in teams of two or three for approximately five hours beginning
at midnight. His confession, which was obtained without informing him of the
right to counsel and after denying him access to his parents, was admitted at
trial and he was convicted of first-degree murder. His conviction was
ultimately reversed after the Supreme Court found his confession was illegally
taken. 94 Fourteen years later in Gallegos v. Colorado, the Supreme Court reversed
a fourteen year old's conviction for first degree murder after finding that his
confession, which was taken after he was held in police custody for five days
without seeing either an attorney or his parents, was obtained in violation of
due process.9 5 These cases established a principal that courts should take
special precaution to carefully scrutinize confessions given by minors. 96 The
Court reiterated its concern about the manner in which police conduct
interrogations of juvenile suspects in In re Gault,97 the 1967 decision mandating
that the rudiments of due process be available to juvenile defendants tried in
the nation's juvenile courts.98 There, a juvenile court judge questioned a fifteen
year old defendant without advising the juvenile of his right not to answer
questions and have the assistance of counsel.99 He apparently made
incriminating statements.) In holding that a juvenile defendant has the right
to remain silent and the right to counsel at trial, the Court stated that
"admissions and confessions of juveniles require special caution."' 0' Although
the law had shown a long history of unique concern for adolescents and
special attention had been given to their confessions, the Court has more
recently retreated from its protective stance and ruled that confessions by
juveniles should be examined using the same "totality of the circumstances"
test by which adult confessions are tested.102
Just as experience with child witnesses led to the careful consideration of
the ways in which children are questioned, recent experience with police
interrogations of children and adolescents has lead to heightened scrutiny.
Abuse of police authority has been the subject of articles in the vernacular
6
press, 0 3 documentary film, 0 4 and scholarly writing. 05 Courts, 0 empirical

94. Haley, 332 U.S. at 598-600.
95. Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 49-51.
96. See id. at 53 (citing Haley, 332 U.S. at 599-600).
97. In re Gault,387 U.S. at 1.
98. Id. at 57.
99. Id. at 4-11.
100. Id. at 43. There was no verbatim record of the proceeding made and there were
disagreements among the parties in attendance regarding precisely what the youth had admitted.

101. Id. at 45.
102. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-25 (1979).
103. Ken Armstrong et al., Officers Ignore Laws Set Up To Guard Kids: Detectives Grill
Minors Without Juvenile Officers, Parents Present, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 18, 2001, at 1 (describing how
police and prosecutors frequently use abusive tactics when interrogating children and
adolescents); Alex Kotlowitz, The Unprotected,NEW YORKER, Feb. 8, 1999, at 42.
104. MURDER ON A SUNDAY MORNING (CNC Documentary 2003).
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researchers, 07 and commentators in both mental health 0 8 and law'" have
begun carefully examining the methods that police utilize when interrogating
young suspects."o Numerous child witness protections were established to
address the concerns about a child's capacity to provide reliable testimony in
open court subject to cross-examination, and now legislatures and courts have
utilized this knowledge about police-youth interrogation methods to begin
establishing special procedures to protect these vulnerable suspects.' There is
concern, however, that even when legislatures enact measures intended to
protect youth in the interrogation room, law enforcement officers ignore or
undermine their effectiveness.112
As a general matter, "juvenile suspects are more vulnerable than adult
suspects to interrogative pressure."" 3 Yet while numerous procedures have
been adopted to ensure that suggestible children and youth are not improperly
influenced by the professionals who interview them,114 there have been few
procedures mandated to protect youth when they are thought to be the

105. Steven A. Drizin & Beth A. Colgan, Tales From the Juvenile Confession Front. A
Guide to How StandardPolice Intemngation Tactics Can Pduce Coerced andFalse Confessionsfrm Juvenile
Suspects, in INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND ENTRAPMENT (G. Daniel Lassiter ed. 2004).
106. See, e.g., State v. Farrell, 766 A.2d 1057 (N.H. 2001) (requiring reversal of
conviction when police officers failed to comply with statute mandating that they notify the
parent or other adult interested in the welfare of a minor immediately upon arrest).
107. Feld, supra note 93. Professor Feld notes that there is very little empirical work
published regarding what actually happens in the interrogation rooms when youth are
questioned by police. Id. at 234-35.
108. Owen-Kostelnik et al., supra note 33; Allison D. Redlich et al., The Polce
Intemgadon of Children and Adolescents, in INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND ENTRAPMENT,

supra note 105, at 701.
109. Birckhead, supra note 61; Feld, supra note 93.
110. See generaly Armstrong et al., supra note 103 (describing how police and
prosecutors frequently use abusive tactics when interrogating children and adolescents).
111. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 5033 (2006) (requiring officer who arrests a juvenile to advise
the juvenile of his rights in language comprehensible to the juvenile and to immediately notify
the Attorney General and the juvenile's parent or legal custodian); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
594:15 (2001) (requiring that a police officer immediately notify "the parent, nearest relative,
friend or attorney" of an arrested minor); In re Jerrell C.J., 699 N.W.2d 110, 120-24 (Wis. 2005)
(requiring police to electronically record interrogations of juvenile suspects as a condition
precedent to their admission at trial) (citing Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Alaska 1985);
State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994)).
112. See, e.g., State v. Farrell, 766 A.2d 1057, 1060 (N.H. 2001) (describing how police
ignored state law which required immediate notification of a juvenile's parents, other trusted
adult, or an attorney when the juvenile was taken into custody); Armstrong et al., supranote 103,
at 1.
113. Owen-Kostelnik et al., supra note 33, at 291.
114. See, e.g., People v. Katt, 662 N.W.2d 12, 26 (Mich. 2003) (permitting a child's outof-court statement to a children's protective services worker to be admitted in a criminal
prosecution, but only after the witness established that she had not used suggestive or coercive
questioning techniques); State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1382 (N.J. 1994).
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perpetrators." 5 Indeed, when young people are thought to have perpetrated a
crime, their questioning has generally been handled indistinguishably from
adult suspects. For instance, the Supreme Court has held that the same totality
of the circumstances test that is applicable to determining whether an adult's
statements to the police during interrogation were freely and voluntarily made
has been applied to juveniles." 6 Moreover, law enforcement interrogators use
the same intentionally deceptive interviewing techniques with adults as are
used when interrogating juveniles."t 7 Despite serious concern that these
methods may lead juveniles to falsely confess," 8 courts typically approve of
their use." 9
A number of law enforcement questioning techniques have raised concern
that they may contribute to a juvenile suspect making inaccurate statements or
false confessions.120 These include interviewer bias, the intentional isolation of
the adolescent from adults who could be expected to be supportive of him,
suggestive and even coercive methods of questioning, and the use of trickery
and deception to enhance the possibility that the adolescent suspect will make
incriminating statements.121
A major problem with police interrogation of adolescent suspects is that
they are biased interviewers. 12 That is, they come to the interrogation
believing they know the truth of the situation they are investigating, and what
23
truthful answers to their questions are, before they pose the questions.1 As
such, when police initiate the interrogation of juvenile suspects, they are no
115. A minority of jurisdictions have mandated that a juvenile being questioned by
police have an interested adult present during the interrogation. See, e.g., State v. Benoit, 490
A.2d 295, 302 (N.H. 1985), and Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 449 A.2d 654, 657 (Mass. 1983)
(enforcing state statutes which require a parent or other adult to be present at the time a juvenile
is questioned). However, a parent's presence during questioning is frequently not helpful to the
juvenile because the parent encourages the child to waive his or her rights and talk with police.
See BARRY C. FELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ONJUVENILEJUSTICE ADMINISTRATION 318-19 (2d
ed. 2004).
116. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-25 (1979).
117. Feld, supra note 93, at 222.
118. Drizin & Colgan, supra note 105, at 132-33; see also Kotlowitz, supra note 103, at
48.
119. See FELD, supra note 115, at 318-19 (discussing courts' approval of police
interrogation practices); see also Birckhead, supra note 61, at 432 (noting that "courts reinforce
and become complicit in such phenomena as interviewer bias and coercive interviewing
techniques when they fail to find that a suspect's age is a critical factor when determining
whether interrogation was custodial.").
120. Drizin & Colgan, supra note 105 (discussing police use of multiple interviews, use
of fictional evidence of guilt to trick the suspect into confessing, use of reward and punishment
schemes).
121. Feld, supra note 93 (discussing police interrogation techniques).
122. Drizin & Colgan,supra note 105, at 132-33.
123. See FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 5-10

(Jones & Bartlett Publishers 2004) (2001) (describing the differences between interviews and
interrogations and noting that interrogations are accusatory in nature rather than investigative or
for the purpose of gathering information).
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longer searching for the truth. They are questioning the juvenile only for the
purpose of confirming what they already believe they know.124
Adolescent suspects are typically isolated from supportive adults-parents,
guardians, attorneys-who might advise the juvenile regarding the situation.125
This is sometimes true even in the face of clear statutory commands aimed at
law enforcement officers to ensure that youth have supportive adults present
during their interrogation.126
Police investigators routinely use suggestive, even coercive, methods of
interrogating suspects without regard to their age.1 27 Most police officers are
trained in using the Reid interrogation technique.128 Using this methodology,
the investigator may conduct a preliminary interview with a suspect then
proceed to interrogate that individual after the officer has formed the opinion
that the suspect is guilty of the offense. Once interrogation has begun, the
officer will cut off any verbalizations by the suspected perpetrator that
suggests his innocence.129 Despite robust criticism from legal commentators,
30
use of the Reid approach persists.1
Law enforcement interrogators also routinely engage in trickery and
deception to induce adolescents to confess to crimes.' 3 Among other
methods, police present juvenile suspects with false evidence of their guilt,
make promises or imply that they will work to see that the system goes easy on
the juvenile, and tell children that by admitting responsibility they will be able
to go home sooner rather than later.132 Even when police advise youth to tell
the truth, they often couple this suggestion with other questioning techniques
that convert a request for honesty into a form of trickery or manipulation. 33
124. Id.
125. Birckhead, supra note 61, at 411.
126. See, e.g., State v. Farrell, 766 A.2d 1057, 1062 (N.H. 2001) (reversing juvenile
defendant's conviction because police did not comply with a law that required that they contact
an interested adult and permit that adult to be present during questioning).
127. Feld, supra note 93, at 260-61 (discovering questioning techniques such as the use
of leading questions, the use of "maximization techniques"-stressing the level of trouble the
young person is in and the seriousness of the charges being considered and the like-and
"minimization techniques," which essentially provide the juvenile with a social acceptable
excuse for why he committed the crime-e.g., he was drunk or the other person provoked him);
Birckhead, supra note 61, at 416-17.
128. See Feld, supra note 93, at 234-35 (discussing the prevalence of the use of the
Reid technique for suspect interrogation); Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Muliple
Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in CiminalCases, 2006 Wis. L. REv. 291, 334 (citations omitted).
129. Birckhead, supra note 61, at 410-12; Feld, supranote 93, at 236-37, 242-43.
130. Findley & Scott, supra note 128, at 235-37.
131. Feld, supra note 93, at 244-46 (describing numerous instances of trickery that
police engage in to gain confessions by juvenile suspects).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 269-71 (describing an officers' admonitions to 'tell the truth' which were
often combined with other interrogation techniques, and which were aimed at inducing a
juvenile's confession to a crime for which the officer had pre-determined his guilt).
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C.
The law is clear that the prosecutor, like every trial litigant, has the right to
conduct a "full and fair" cross-examination on juvenile defendants and
adolescent witnesses for the defense.' 34 If the prosecutor believes a witness
called on behalf of a juvenile defendant is not telling the truth, they have both
a right and a duty under the law to attempt to expose the witness's
dishonesty. 35 As one California appellate court has observed, even when
questioning a young witness called on behalf of a defendant, the prosecution
may "launch into a searching cross-examination."1 36 While the scope of
prosecutorial cross-examination may properly be broad and deep, a prosecutor
has neither any legal authority to, nor any legitimate interest in, using improper
questioning techniques to destroy the credibility of a juvenile witness.
When juveniles testify on their own behalf or on behalf of other
defendants, the prosecutors' cross-examination may suffer from many of the
same weaknesses that plague a young child's improperly conducted interview
by a social services investigator, or a law enforcement officers' interrogation of
a juvenile crime suspect. Prosecutors are prime examples of the sort of biased
interviewers that led to the call for the adoption of forensic interviewing
protocols to document or to reduce the incidence of undue influence on
young witnesses. 3 7 Indeed, they may be the quintessential biased interviewer.
After all, if they did not believe the juvenile was guilty, they would not--or, at
least, should not-have brought the charges in the first place. A prosecutor
conducting cross-examination on a juvenile defendant is in a similar position
to a forensic interviewer examining a child who may have been abused for the
first time. He has some information about what may have happened, but is
unlikely to know all the facts and circumstances of the incident at issue. Like a
social worker conducting a forensic interview of a child who may have been
sexually abused, a prosecutor, when he cross-examines a juvenile defendant, is
supposed to be seeking the truth in the particular matter. He is not supposed
to be merely confirming some preconceived notion of what he believes
happened.
Returning to DeShawn's case for a moment, it seems clear that the
prosecutor was unaware of the prior existing relationship between the
complaining witness and the juvenile defendant. Rather than the new
134. ANTHONY J. BOCCHINo & DAVID A. SONENSTEIN, FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE WITH OBJECTIONs 26 (NITA 2008); FED. RULES EVID. 611 ("For every witness

presented by a party, the adverse party has the right to a full and fair cross-examination.").
135. People v. Ah Wing, 169 P. 402, 404 (Cal. Ct. App. 1917) (asserting that a
prosecutor may use every legal means to vindicate his belief if he thinks a witness is not telling
the truth).
136. People v. Brown, 14 Cal. Rptr. 370, 372 (Ct. App. 1971).
137. POOLE & LAMB, rupra note 70, at 106-09. See general# KATHLEEN COULBORN
FALLER, INTERVIEWING CHILDREN ABOUT SEXUAL ABUSE: CONTROVERSIES AND BEST

PRACTICE 66-89 (2007).
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information altering his theory of the case, he maintained his predetermined
belief in what happened, became more aggressive, and savagely attacked the
young witness. If a social worker in the field questioned a child in this way, he
would be heavily criticized, if not excoriated for his conduct, for disregarding
newly developed information and for trying to dominate the interviewee-child
to vindicate some predetermined truth of the matter.
From a developmental standpoint, it makes no difference whether the
youth is thought to be a victim of a crime or suspected of perpetrating a
criminal offense.' 38 Children suspected of involvement in criminal behavior
39
are at least as vulnerable to coercive question techniques as child victims.
Indeed, given the overrepresentation among juvenile offenders of traumatized
children with serious mental health concerns, developmental disorders, and
learning disabilities, there is good reason to be concerned that juveniles
suspected of violating the law may be more vulnerable to suggestive and
coercive questioning than the average child victim.
Due to their psychosocial immaturity, one aspect of normal adolescent
development is that during these years many youths may experience
objectively non-threatening stimuli as a threat.140 This aspect of development
may well be magnified in adolescents charged with criminal conduct. Since so
many minors involved in serious delinquent behavior have had traumatic life
experiences, the juvenile-defendant-witness may experience a "[h]eightened
sensitivity to perceived threats" which they may well meet with aggression and
hostility.141 Thus, for some allegedly delinquent kids, the overly zealous
prosecutor will be perceived as posing a threat that triggers the juvenile's flight
or fight response.142 Such a youth may meet the perceived aggression that is
138. Birckhead, supra note 61, at 427.
139. Id.
140. THE NATIONAL CHILD TRAUMATIC STRESS NETWORK, HELPING TRAUMATIZED
CHILDREN: TIPS FOR JUDGES 1, http://www.nctsnet.org/nccts/asset.do? id=1471 (last visited
Apr. 22, 2010) [hereinafter HELPING TRAUMATIZED CHILDREN].
141. Id. ("A majority of children involved in the juvenile justice system have a history
of trauma. Children and adolescents who come into the court system frequently have
experienced not only chronic abuse and neglect, but also exposure to substance abuse, domestic
violence, and community violence.").
142. Debra Nichoff, Invisible Scars: The Neurobiological Consequences of Child
Abuse, 56 DePaul L. Rev. 847, 855-56 (2007).
An encounter with an assailant, for example, triggers the familiar fight or flight response:
heart and lungs work harder, energy stored in the form of fat and glycogen is mobilized
to fuel active muscles, white blood cells are deployed to fend off infection after injury,
and nonessential functions like reproduction are temporarily suspended. At the cost of
temporarily increasing the burden on the heart and lungs, flooding the body with insulin,
and consuming energy reserves (an imposition physiologists refer to as allostatic load),
these adjustments ensure that tissues vital to the escape effort receive sufficient amounts
of oxygen and glucose during a period of greater demand.
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displayed during zealous prosecutorial questioning with reciprocal aggression.
This may explain why DeShawn lashed out at the prosecutor. It may also
explain why L.G. reacted in such a hostile manner to the prosecutor's
aggressive questioning in the L G. case. While some youth will lash out, others
may exhibit symptoms of withdrawal and refuse to continue answering
questions. 143

Despite the fact, developmentally speaking, that child suspects and victims
are similarly situated, the law has treated these two classes of young people
very differently. The law has developed numerous protections for child-victimwitnesses, while children thought to be the perpetrators of crime derive none
of the specific benefits of such compassionate treatment. This inconsistency
has not been lost on observers of the legal system.144 The disparate treatment
of youthful-victims and youthful-perpetrators has led to calls for reform in
interrogation techniques; there is a need for greater consistency in the
questioning of children by law enforcement officers, and a need to ensure the
accuracy of the child's statements.1 45 As one commentator has argued:
Courts and legislatures must cease to reinforce the biases exhibited by law
enforcement towards juvenile suspects and must, instead, take the lead in
promoting and instituting reforms and procedural safeguards for the
interrogation of juvenile suspects that are comparable to those that now exist
for the questioning of child victims and witnesses. 146
While the defendant is entitled to the presumption of innocence from the
court, he is entitled to no such thing from the prosecution.147 A prosecutor
conducting cross-examination of a juvenile defendant or witness, like an
Id.
The first two responses, 'fight ot flight,' are a response tendency recognized for at least
seventy years and involve either attacking the threatening stimulus or fleeing after the
body and mind have been mobilized for action. Fight responses under intense stress
typically involve surprise, startle responses, impulsive acting, disorientation and mental
confusion, and disorganized action sequences.
Harold Hall et al., Extreme Mental orEmoionalDisturbance (EMED), 23 U. HAW. L. REV. 431, 458
(2001).
143. While some alleged delinquents with histories of trauma may engage in the
survival mechanism of "fight," others will engage in "flight," that is, they may withdraw into
themselves and be non-communicative, discontinue answering questions. See HELPING
TRAUMATIZED CHILDREN, supra note 140, at 1. For an example of a case in which an adolescent
witness was unable to answer questions on cross-examination and, as a result, had her testimony
stricken from the record, see People v. Davidson, No. D044834, 2005 WL 3346290, at *3-4
(Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2005).
144. Owen-Kostelnik et al., supra note 33, at 298; Birckhead, supra note 61, at 420-24.
145. Birckhead, supra note 61, at 429-32.
146. Id. at 432.
147. I have been reminded of this point repeatedly by prosecutors in the past two
decades.
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officer interrogating a juvenile suspect, is not seeking the truth because he or
she believes they know what the truth is-they believe that the juvenile
defendant is guilty of the crime or that the juvenile witness testifying on behalf
of the defendant is mistaken, or worse, intentionally lying. Like police officers,
then, prosecutors are biased interviewers. While prosecutors are charged with
seeking a just result and ensuring that a defendant receives a fair trial, they
nonetheless have predetermined that the juvenile defendant is guilty, or they
would not have brought the charge for which the defendant is standing trial.
Since they believe that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, in their
minds, their aggressive conduct on cross-examination is justifiable. Like police
interrogators, prosecutors use coercive questioning techniques. The very act of
cross-examination is intended to permit the questioner to control the witness'
answers by carefully controlling the form and content of the questions
asked; 48 this is the point of permitting the use of leading questions on crossexamination.149

While a police interrogator is advised to isolate the suspect from those who
might be of assistance, or to minimize the impact of those persons, crossexamination takes place in an open courtroom. However, it is clear that
children and youth often feel isolated while testifying.150 This is why, in the
child-victim-witness context, the law quite often permits the child to have a
support person sit nearby while he or she is testifying.' 5 ' The natural sense of
isolation that children feel while testifying is intentionally exacerbated when
prosecutors encroach upon the witness' physical space, raise their voices to
intimidate, demand that juvenile witnesses look at them or refrain from
looking at others in the courtroom who may be supportive, or when they
intentionally position themselves in the courtroom so as to block the juvenile's
view of his attorney or supportive family members.
Like law enforcement officers, prosecutors often resort to trickery to get
juvenile defendants and witnesses to make ill-considered statements during
cross-examination.152 Basic trial practice textbooks recommend such
techniques. For example, Thomas Mauet in his text TrialTechniques advises that
"[s]uccessful cross-examinations are sometimes based on indirecion--theability
to establish points without the witness perceiving your purpose or becoming
aware of the point until it has been established."153

148. MAUET, supra note 36, at 261.
149. Id. at 257.
150. See MYERS, supra note 2, at 157-61 (describing the isolation sometimes felt by
child witnesses).
151. Id (collecting cases); see also 18 U.S.C. S 3509(i) (2006).
152. Reeves, supra note 56, at 5 (advising prosecutors to "set subtle traps for the]
witness" and to "1. Use innocuous questions to set up big questions 2. Witness shouldn't see
questions coming so won't [sic] be able to plan answers"); see aso Holmgren, supra note 56.
153. MAUET, supra note 36, at 255.
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Because prosecutors may engage in many of the problematic interviewing
and cross-examination techniques that the law has been concerned about with
young children and, more recently, with the interrogation of juvenile suspects,
it is the duty of the court to govern such prosecutorial behavior. This ensures
that the trial remains a search for the truth and does not simply devolve into
an ordeal to be endured by the adolescent witness. The next section will
address the responsibility of the courts and the tools currently available to
meet that responsibility.
IV.

A defendant, including a juvenile defendant, has the right to trial by an
impartial fact finder, whether by a judge in a bench trial or a jury.' A trial
judge has a duty to ensure that a defendant, whether in a juvenile or adult
prosecution, receives a fair trial.15 However, two areas of social science
research suggest problems with a judge's ability or willingness to fulfill this
duty. First, research suggests that legal professionals overestimate the linguistic
abilities of children and youths. 5 6 This problem seems to be particularly
exaggerated with adolescents. Debra Poole and Michael Lamb, in their book
on interviewing children, describe research demonstrating that legal
professionals ask-and courts permit them to ask-questions of child
witnesses which children simply do not understand.' 57 In the study described,
fifty percent of six year olds could correctly repeat questions asked of them
while only ten percent of fourteen and fifteen year olds could properly repeat
the questions asked.' 58 The reason, they argue, is that legal professionals
overestimate the linguistic capacities of older children resulting in the use of
more complicated words and more complex question structures, which results
in less understanding.159 If judges do not understand verbal and other
limitations of adolescents, they cannot properly exercise their discretion to
control the questioning.
Secondly, research suggests that trial judges may be predisposed to
disbelieve juvenile defendants who testify on their own behalf as well as
60
juvenile witnesses who testify on behalf of other criminal defendants.1 This
154. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (finding that a trial with a judge who
had a direct monetary interest in the outcome of the case violated due process of law); see also In
re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1967) (holding that a juvenile delinquency proceeding must contain
those elements of due process necessary to ensure fundamental fairness).
155. Pinard, supra note 2, at 274 (citing ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE
ADMINISTRATION OF CRUMINALJUSTICE 167 (1974)). See generaly In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 1.
156. POOLE & LAMB, supra note 70, at 154-55 (citing BRENNAN & BRENNAN, supra
note 82, at 62 (discussing a study of trial transcripts in which a high percentage of children
misunderstood the questions put to them)).
157. POOLE & LAMB, supra note 70, at 154.

158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Birckhead, supranote 61, at 392 (citations omitted).
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could explain why in DeShawn's case the trial judge disbelieved his coherent
story, which was supported by other witnesses and ascribed more credibility to
the adult's story despite the fact that the adult had demonstrably lied. It may
also help to explain why the judge refused to impose controls on the
prosecutor's conduct of cross-examination.
In our adversary system of justice, judges are generally thought of as playing
a passive role.161 Both appellate courts 162 and commentators have criticized
trial judges for being too actively involved in questioning witnesses or
otherwise stepping out of their role as an impartial arbiter of the process.163 In
the context in which a juvenile is on trial or an instrumental witness for the
defense, however, the trial judge may need .to play a more active role in
ensuring that the youth has a fair opportunity to give his or her evidence in a
coherent manner. 1 Current law provides judges several tools for doing so.

161. Pinard, supra note 2, at 251-53.
162. West v. State, 519 So. 2d 418, 424 (Miss. 1988) (holding that it is reversible error
for a trial judge to be actively involved in murder trial on behalf of the prosecution); State v.
Taffaro, 950 A.2d 860, 866 (N.J. 2008) (finding trial court's questioning of defendant during
contempt trial improper because it underscored the weaknesses of the defense and suggested to
the jury that the court doubted the defendant's version of the facts).
Upon our review of the record in this case we find that the Trial Judge unduly injected
himself into the trial by his excessive questioning and examination of the witnesses which
tended to emphasize the key elements of the prosecution's case and trivialize the theory
of the defense. By his conduct, the Trial Judge assumed the role of an advocate rather
than an impartial referee and thereby denied defendant a fair trial.
People v. Cruz, 473 N.Y.S.2d 21, 22 (App. Div. 1984).
163. Pinard, supra note 2, at 267-69. Professor Pinard criticizes trial judges for their
overactive involvement in trials in ways that communicate bias in favor of the prosecution and
which prejudices the defendant. His criticism based upon judicial acts of commission is well
placed. However, he recognizes that just as a judge may project bias and prejudice through
overactive participation (e.g., hostile questioning of defense witnesses, facial expressions
suggesting disbelief on the part of the judge to testimony offered by a defendant or his
witnesses), he or she may also communicate bias or prejudice through acts of omission by
failing to step in to control the process when the circumstances require that the judge do so to
protect the integrity of the truth finding process of the trial. Id.
164. See general MYERS, supra note 2, at 154-57 ("Children often are intimidated by
testifying, and attorneys ask questions children cannot understand. When the court detects a
breakdown in communication, the judge may require counsel to reframe questions in
developmentally appropriate language. Additionally, the judge may question children to ensure
understanding.").
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A.
In some circumstances, trial judges are granted broad authority to control
how litigants present evidence.s65 Indeed, Federal Rule of Evidence 611,
which has been adopted in some form by a vast majority of states,166 imposes
a duty on trial court judges to exercise control over the presentation of
evidence, including the examination of witnesses.167 That rule provides three
rationales for this requirement, two of which are relevant to the present
discussion. First, the court must control the presentation of evidence in order
to ensure that the trial serves its ultimate purpose of ascertaining the truth.' 68
The rule contemplates that a judge must be as active as necessary to "see that
the trial is just." 69
Secondly, the court is charged with the duty to protect witnesses from
"harassment or undue embarrassment."170 Trial courts have broad discretion
under Rule 611 to govern the conduct of cross-examination and may even
exclude some lines of inquiry if they are deemed to be of little relevance.' 7'
Thus, for instance, where evidence of a witness' possible drug addiction holds
little probative value regarding the issues in the case, yet holds the possibility
of unfairly prejudicing a prosecution witness, a defendant may be denied,
despite the Sixth Amendment right to conduct cross-examination, from raising

165. Id. at 141; Pinard, supra note 2, at 278-79 (noting that sometimes judges will need
to intervene in the proceeding in order to assure a defendant's constitutional rights are
protected).
166. See ALA. R. EvID. RULE 611; ALASKA R. EvID. 611; ARIz. R. EVID. 611; ARK. R.
EvID. 611; CAL. EVID. CODE %5765-767, 772-773; COLO. R EvID. 611; CONN. CODE OF EVID.
%56-8; DEL. R. EvID. 611; FLA. STAT. § 90.612 (2009); HAW. R. EVID. 611 (2009); IDAHO R.
EvID. 611; IND. R. EVID. 611; IOWA R. EVID. 5.611; KY. R. EVID. 611; LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art.
611 (2009); ME. R. EVID. 611; MD. CODE ANN., MD. RuLEs § 5-611 (2009); MICH. R. EVID. 611;
MINN. R. EVID. 611; MISs. R. EvID. 611; MONT. I. EviD. 611; NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. S 27-611
(2009); NEV. REV. STAT. § 50.115 (2007); N.H. R. EVID. 611; N.J.R. EVID. 611; N.M.R. EVID. 11611; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-611 (2008); N.D.R. EVID. 611; OHIo R. EVID. 611; OR. REV. STAT. §
40.370 (2008); PA. R. EVID. 611; R.I.R. EvID. 611; S.C.R. EvID. 611; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1914-18 to 20 (2009); TENN. R. EVID. 611; TEx. R. EVID. 611; UTAH R. EviD. 611; VT. R. EVID.
611; WASH. R. EVID. 611; W. VA. R. EVID. 611; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 906.11 (2009); WYo. R. EVID.
611.
167. See FED. R. EviD. 611(a) ("The court shall exercise reasonable control over the
mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the
interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless
consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.').
Some states have addressed the judge's duty to control the presentation of evidence to ensure
that a trial is a search for the truth. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 765(a); N.J.R. EVID. § 611(a);
ME. R. EVID. § 611(a); MICH. COMP. LAWs SERV. § 768.29 (LexisNexis 2005); Cranberg v.
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 756 F.2d 382, 391 (5th Cit. 1985) (describing the court's
"affirmative obligation" to control the proceeding).
168. FED. R. EvID. 611(a)(1).
169. Cranberg, 756 F.2d at 391.
170. FED. R. EVID. 611(a)( 3 ).
171. United States v. Kizer, 569 F.2d 504, 505 (9th Cir. 1978).
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the issue during cross-examination.172 This authority to protect witnesses from
harassment extends to the form of questions asked and the manner-tone of
voice and physical gestures accompanying the questioning-in which they are
73

put.1
In general, leading questions are permitted only during cross-examination
by the party against whom the witness testifies.174 Both federal and state
courts, however, have long permitted the use of leading questions on direct
examination when the witness is young and the court believes that doing so is
necessary to enable the youth to testify.175 Thus, the court has the flexibility to
adapt the traditional mode of questioning in order to protect young witnesses
and to ensure that they have a fair opportunity to give their evidence.
Similarly, courts have long had the authority to limit cross-examination as
necessary to maintain the truth-seeking function of the trial. In Delaware v. Van
Arsdall, the Court noted that a trial court has broad discretion to limit crossexamination by defense counsel when necessary to address concerns about
"harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or
interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant." 7 6 This same rule
must, of course, apply to the court's duty to control the prosecutor's conduct
during cross-examination because the rationales offered for the rule granting
the court authority to limit cross examination by defense counsel are equally
applicable to prosecutors. Indeed, the court's authority to circumscribe
vexatious cross-examination by the prosecution may be stronger than its
authority to limit cross by defense counsel because, as noted earlier, the
prosecutor, unlike a criminal defendant, has no constitutionally protected right
77
to conduct cross-examination.'
Similarly, the argument for courts to exercise the authority granted them in
Rule 611 to control prosecutorial cross-examination is strengthened by the
prosecutor's duty to do justice rather than merely advance the interests of a

172. Id. at 506.
173. See general# Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986) (noting that the
trial court has broad discretion to control the questioning of witnesses).
174. FED. R. EVID. 611(c). However, some states have, by statute, granted courts
broad authority to permit the use of leading questions at any time. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS
SERV. § 768.24 (LexisNexis 2005) ('Within the discretion of the court no question asked of a
witness shall be deemed objectionable solely because it is leading.").
175. MYERs, supra note 2, at 148-150 (collecting dozens of cases in which courts have
approved the use of leading questions on direct examination by prosecutors where the witness is
a child).
176. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679.
177. As the Van Arsdall Court made dear, even where the defendant has a
constitutionally protected right to confront witnesses against him for the purpose of conducting
cross-examination, the court may limit that cross to ensure the truth-seeking function of the
proceeding is maintained, or to prevent witnesses from being harassed in the same manner as
DeShawn. See id. at 679.
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client or secure a conviction. 78 First, prosecutors or former prosecutors have
themselves recognized that the way in which they frame a question may
influence the truthfulness and accuracy of the response.' 79 Next, in the present
context, the commentator James C. Backstrom, himself a prosecutor, has
observed that
[t]he juvenile prosecutor should assume the traditional adversary role in the
adjudicatory hearing, recognizing, however, the particular vulnerability of child
witnesses. All juvenile witnesses, including suspects should they testify, must be
treated fairly and with sensitivity in direct examination, cross-examination, and
throughout the process. 80
Too often in practice, the prosecutor's behavior falls short of this sensible
standard. When a prosecutor does so, it is incumbent upon the trial court
judge to step in and impose controls on the prosecutor to ensure the trial's
truth-seeking function is preserved.
In exercising their discretion pursuant to Rule 611, courts should be vigilant
about ensuring that the language used, the pacing and the form of questions
are intended to secure a coherent story from the juvenile witness rather than
to confuse or intimidate. As noted earlier, legal professionals tend to
overestimate the linguistic abilities of adolescents. Trial judges should ensure
that the language used by the prosecutor is understandable to the adolescent
witness, that is, that each question is asked in a developmentally appropriate
manner.18' Courts should not, for instance, permit prosecutors to ask
convoluted, multipart questions to a juvenile witness. Recall that in In re LG.,
in response to a multipart question by the prosecutor, the youth responded by
swearing, suggesting strongly that the witness was confused and frustrated by
82
his inability to follow the question.1
B.
While Rule 611 imposes a duty and provides a broad grant of authority to
courts to control the conduct of cross-examination by prosecutors, it is by no
means the only tool available to courts and advocates to ensure that juvenile
defendants and supporting witnesses are given a fair opportunity to present
their evidence in a way that will maintain the truth-seeking function of the trial

178. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2006).
179. Bennett L. Gershman, Witness Coaching By Prosecutors,23 CARDOzO L. REv. 829,
844-45 (2002) (noting that young witnesses are especially vulnerable to the influence of
prosecutors' suggestive or coercive questioning techniques).
180. James C. Backstrom & Gary L. Walker, The Role of the Prosecutor in juvenile Justice:
Advocacy in the Courtroomand Laderthr in the Communio, 50 S. C. L. Rev. 699, 709 (1999).
181. To do so, judges may need to seek out training in child and adolescent
development.
182. See supra Part I.B.
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process. It is worth reiterating here that adolescents alleged to be delinquent
are likely to be developmentally delayed and function more like a younger
child, sometimes profoundly so.183 Judges should be aware of this fact and
should respond accordingly with a focus on the youth's developmental rather
than chronological age.
With these basic principals in mind, courts could take steps to ensure
adolescents can provide their testimony in a fair manner. When adolescent
witnesses are called to testify, courts should instruct the juvenile witness about
the "rules" of testifying. Young people could be instructed, beyond the taking
of the oath, about the duty to tell the truth and as well as the consequences of
lying.'8 Courts should implement questioning practices in the courtroom that
emulate those that we now expect social work investigators to implement
when interviewing children and youth suspected of having been victims of
abuse or neglect. These may include limiting-perhaps severely-the use of
leading questions or other questioning techniques in the courtroom that would
be considered improperly coercive in the interview suite at the local child
advocacy center.
In the mid-1990's, Debra Poole and Michael Lamb emerged as leading
proponents of interviewing protocols for social services investigators who
interview youth and children who are, or may be, victims of child abuse or
neglect.185 In response, a number of jurisdictions have adopted interviewing
protocols for law enforcement officers and children's protective services
workers. For instance, Michigan, where I practice, adopted a Forensic
Interviewing Protocol in 1998, the use of which is mandated by statute.18 6 The
protocol, which was largely written by Professor Poole, 87 is a seven-stage
interview protocol designed to ensure that information elicited from the childinterviewee is accurate and well developed.' 88 Some elements of these
protocols could be adapted and adopted by courts when adolescent
defendants are called to the stand. First, the judge should introduce him or
herself, and should explain the courtroom and its procedures to the youth.
The judge should answer any questions the youth may have regarding
testifying, his rights, or the courtroom setting. Next, the court should establish
the basic ground rules for the giving of testimony. For instance, the judge
should remind the witness not to guess when attempting to answer a question;
that if he or she is uncertain of the answer, "I don't know" is the appropriate

183. See text accompanying notes 57-65, supra (discussing the elevated rates of
developmental delay and dysfunction found among minors facing prosecution).
184. See Myers, supra note 31, at 331-32.
185. See POOLE & LAMB, supra note 70.
186. MicH. CoMP. LAWs SERV. 5 722.628 (LexisNexis 2005).
187. STATE OF MICH. GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON CHILDREN'S JUSTICE AND
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, FORENSIC INTERVIEWING PROTOCOL (2005).
188. Id.
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response. Without the judge's explicit permission to respond with "I don't
know," a child or adolescent may feel compelled to provide a substantive
answer to every question posed. Similarly, the judge should explicitly instruct
the young witness that it is acceptable for them to tell the court when they do
not understand a question. The judge should instruct the juvenile that if the
questioner is incorrect, he or she should correct the questioner and explain
how the questioner is wrong in some aspect of the question. The judge should
then ask the youth a question for practice. For instance, the judge might ask
the youth, "What is my dog's name?" Obviously, the youth would not know
whether the judge has a dog, or if she does, the dog's name, and should
respond, "I don't know." 89 Trial courts routinely undertake this sort of
instruction to young witnesses when they are thought to be the victims of
crimes, and to implement these procedures when the youngster is the
defendant or called on behalf of a defendant would be no substantial
imposition upon the court.190
189. See general# FALLER, supra note 137, at 68.
1) If I misunderstand something you say, please tell me. I want to get it right.
2) If you don't understand something I say, please tell me and I will try again.
3) If you feel uncomfortable at any time, please tell me or show me with the stop sign.
4) Even if you think I already know something, please tell me anyway.
5) If you are not sure about the answer, please do not guess, tell me you're not sure
before you say it.
6) Please [sic] when you are describing something, I wasn't there.
7) Please remember that I will not get angry at you or upset with you.
8) Only talk about things that are true and really happened.
Id. (describing the Stepwise Interview technique which suggests the aforementioned rules be
explained to child-interviewees).
190. For young witnesses when they are the alleged victims of a crime, this sort of
instruction for has become standard in criminal proceedings. For instance, the following
exchange took place between a judge and an eleven year old girl when she was called to testify
during a preliminary hearing in a case in which her stepfather was charged with three counts of
sexually assaulting her (the child's narne has been changed to protect her identity):
THE
THE
THE
THE
THE
THE

COURT: Hello, what's your name?
Abby.
WITNESS:
COURT: What's your last name?
Baxter.
WITNESS:
COURT: How old are you Abby?
I'm 11.
WITNESS:

THE COURT: ... Well, welcome to my court. You understand what it means to tell the
truth?
Yes.
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT: What happens if somebody tells a lie?
They'll get in trouble.
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT: Yeah ....
THE COURT: .. . Is it ever good to tell a lie?
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In addition to this common law remedy, there may be statutes in place that
would facilitate adolescents' testimony. Child witness protection statutes may
be written broadly enough to include juvenile witnesses called on behalf of a
defendant.' 9' If such a statute in fact applies, the juvenile defendant or juvenile
witness may be provided a support person while testifying,192 may be deposed
on videotape rather than having to testify in open court,193 or may qualify for
the use of an independent questioner rather than having the lawyers question
the witness directly.194 Young people may need to take breaks during their
testimony.'95
Some will argue, of course, that it is the duty of the defense attorney to
prepare her witnesses to testify, and there is certainly merit to that position.
However, the duty to ensure that a trial maintains its truth-seeking purpose
and to protect all witnesses from overzealous cross-examination ultimately
No.
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT: No, I don't think so either. So, I want to make sure that as you are asked
questions today, you make sure first of all you understand what the question is okay? And
if you don't understand it's perfectly okay to say that you don't understand.
Okay.
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT: And sometimes adults say questions that are somewhat confusing and if
you don't understand don't be bashful to say so okay?
Okay.
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT: It's also okay if you don't remember or don't know the answer to a
question; it's perfectly okay to say that. That's a lot better than making something up. Am
I right?
Right.
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT: Okay.
'Cause then you'll be lying.
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT: Then you'd be lying. That's exactly right. And in court that is especially
important isn't it? To tell the truth I mean. Am I right?
Yes.
THE WITNESS:
Transcript of Record at 7-10, People v. Johnson, Preliminary Exam, Washtenaw County Circuit
Court, Case No. 09-1213-FC.
191. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. S 3509 (2006) (permitting the use of special protective
measures when a minor witness is called to testify); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 868.5 - 868.8 (West
2008); HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8011D-4 (LexisNexis 2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-3023 (2004);
KAN. STAT. ANN. S 22-3433 (2007); MICH. COMP. LAws SERV. § 600.2163 (LexisNexis 2005); Mo.
REV. STAT. S 491.680 (1996); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. S 29-1925 (LexisNexis 2009); N.D. CENT.

CODE § 12.1-35-02 (2009).
192. MYERS, supra note 2, at 157-59 (discussing the law relating to the presence of a
support person while a child testifies and citing social science research indicting that the
presence of a support person can enhance a child's capacity to answer questions).
193. See, e.g.,18 U.S.C. § 3509(b)(2) (2006) (permitting use of videotaped deposition
for taking child's testimony).
194. See, e.g., MiCH. CT. R. 3.923(F) (permitting court broad authotity to use
independent questioners to aide in securing the testimony of youth).
195. Myers, supra note 31, at 335 (citing State v. Hillman, 613 So. 2d 1053, 1058-59
(La. Ct. App. 1993)).
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rests with the court. Courts should institute procedures to ensure these
youthful witnesses are given a fair opportunity to give their evidence to the
court free from harassment or trickery.

CONCLUSION
For many juvenile defendants and adolescent witnesses called on their
behalf, testifying is an ordeal rather than a part of an orderly search for the
truth of a matter. This is because prosecutors are too frequently permitted to
overzealously cross-examine youthful witnesses. The law has learned a great
deal over the past two decades about the dangers of inappropriately
questioning child witnesses, and, more recently, from the interrogation
techniques used by law enforcement officers when questioning juveniles. Too
often, prosecutors' cross-examinations take on the worst elements of both of
these areas of concern. Ultimately, courts have a duty to ensure that juveniles
have a fair opportunity to present their testimony free from overzealous
prosecutorial cross-examination. But courts are not without tools to address
this problem. Courts should embrace their duty to ensure that trials of
juveniles maintain their truth-seeking purpose. To ensure that a trial remains a
search for the truth, courts should exercise their considerable discretion to
mandate that prosecutorial cross-examination be conducted in a
developmentally sensitive manner.

